Social
Work’s Identity Problem:
The Past, The (Old) Paradigm, The Practice,
The Profession, The Philosophy and The (New) Paradigm
By
James W. Thomson
For
Richard (Dick) Ramsay
SOWK 591
Faculty of Social Welfare, University of Calgary
October 15, 1987
Note: The hard copy of this paper scanned and digitalized. Hopefully, all related errors have been corrected. Minor editing was carried out.
A Personal Introduction
What primarily drew me to social work
as a vocation was what I interpreted to be its offer of meaningful, purposeful,
ethical and challenging employment. As a social worker I would be paid to “help
people.” However, when family and friends asked me what a social worker did,
although they pretended to be pacified by my response, “they help people,” I
could tell they were not satisfied by this answer at all. In turn, I too became
dissatisfied with such a ubiquitous answer. After all, most jobs in society
“help people” indirectly, if not directly. I had to stop and ask myself if I
knew what I was about to become. I felt an embarrassing lack of identity
whenever I told someone I was studying to be a social worker.
After much reading, two practica and a summer job as a social worker, I now
have a fuller sense of identity as a social worker. I can now describe a little
more to my satisfaction what a social worker does and I detect less pretence of
pacification on the part of others when I explain what a social worker does.
Nevertheless, this sense of social worker identity is not yet as fully
developed as I want it to become.
I also feel far
less self-conscious about the lack
of social worker identity now that I know the entire discipline of social work
has had an ongoing identity problem of its own. I appreciate now that it wasn’t
Just me not being clear on what a social worker did as it was the whole
discipline of social work not having a reasonable consensus on Just what should
pass for the identifying conceptual framework for the discipline of social
work. Consequently, I sense that my own fuller identity as a social worker can
be best nurtured, in part, by contributing to the current efforts of the social
work discipline to identify itself through a common conceptual framework. This
paper begins my contribution.
A More Academic Introduction
Current attempts to design a common conceptual framework, universally
adoptable by social workers, independent of their particular practice methods,
knowledge, and skills are mostly traceable to a general systems, ecological
systems or, most recently, natural systems perspective (Ramsay, 1986). Despite
social work’s century of practice, it continues to wrestle with an identity
problem and systems approaches are, at this very moment, single—handedly trying
to pin the shoulders of the social work identity to the mat. Such an identity
pin would allow much of the historically misdirected energies of the social
work profession to be redirected to its global mission of facilitating
individual human and humankind’s peaceful co-existence with their changing selves
and their changing environments.
The long-term purpose of this paper is to set the stage for a second paper
in which I will present a comparison study of general systems, ecological
systems and natural systems theory from a social work perspective and conclude
by recommending a common conceptual framework largely based upon Ramsay’s
common conceptual framework. The immediate purpose of this paper is to offer an
historical explanation of why social work has had a century-long wrestling
match with its own experienced, elusive and wily *hydra-like social work
identity.
[* In Greek Mythology: The Lernaean Hydra was a huge serpent with several heads killed by Heracles as his second labor. As soon as one head was cut off, two more grew, until Heracles commanded his friend Iolaos to cauterize the wound with a hot iron.]
The Past
The past, spotlighted here,
originates in the late 19th century and early 20th century in the U.S.A. The
two key performers on the American social work stage were Jane Addams and Mary
Richmond. Their respective roles and influences were pivotal in splitting the
social work movement into two disparate casts (Franklin, 1986). Franklin
outlines how the scenario of Addams’ and Richmond’s personal backgrounds, the
prevailing intellectual and religious ideologies, along with ready-to-adopt
models from England of Settlement Houses and the Charity Organization Societies
(COS), provided a setting wherein Addams and Richmond were apt to see different
roles for social workers and different means to perform those roles.
Richmond took the COS role which espoused the “rehabilitation” of needy humans.
Rehabilitation was necessary as the appropriate moral character was lacking and
could best be instilled through proper education available through the COS.
This “moral certainty” approach survived despite empirical evidence indicating
lack of moral character was not likely the source, or at least not the sole
source, of poverty. The evidence (Franklin, p. 509) was an English study by
Charles Booth in 1885 and an American economic depression in 1893, which
demonstrated that anyone, given the circumstances, is vulnerable to societal
forces. The Settlement House Movement had a more holistic approach in that it
looked to the fabric of the surrounding society, “the experiences, thinking,
and actions of local populations that could affect broad social and economic
reforms” (Franklin, p. 508).
Addams’ impact was cut short as a result of her donning too high a political
profile (Franklin, p. 513). With Addams’ fall from grace, Richmond’s links to
the medical model, to the moral certainty model, and to the rising popularity
of psychoanalysis, led to the social work stage being reset for a preoccupation
with the person (social casework), at the expense of the person-in-environment
(PIE) model (Franklin, p. 519). This preoccupation prevailed into the 1960’s.
The Paradigm (Old)
Franklin reminds us of Thomas Kuhn’s concept of “paradigm shift” which
results when the existing rules of a discipline or group are no longer
sufficient to resolve their problems, necessitating a new model of protocol for
problem resolution to result. The paradigm shift in social work as stated by
Franklin was from one of moral certainty to rational inquiry (also Austin,
1983, p.365) and didn’t start its full shift until the 1960’s.
Clearly the
paradigm shift to rational inquiry, which is now Paradigm (Old), was long
overdue given the experiences of the Great Depression (Popple, 1985) and the 1960’s civil
rights and peace movements (Meyer, 1983) when social workers were not organized
to meet these societal level challenges. The casework practice model of Mary
Richmond’s was not designed to intervene on a societal level. New practice methods
were in demand.
The Practice
Although casework practice methods
dominated until the 1960’s, this is not to say that the reform movement with it
roots in the settlement house movement had not continued, albeit in a
subordinate position. The reform movement was not particularly concerned with
development of a systematic practice method (Meyer, 1983, pp. 6-7). Group work,
which sprouted from the settlement house movement did become methodologically
sensitive as it embraced a rational inquiry involving problem identification,
stating a hypothesis, testing the hypothesis, and verification. Group work, in
part, developed a kinship in its concern for method with casework (with its
roots in the COS movement) because group work and casework occurred in similar
settings. Family treatment methods gradually developed out of casework and thus
inherited a methodological sensitivity.
Ironically,
social work, having been almost religiously committed to casework for some four
decades prior to the 1960’s, has seen an explosion of differential practice
methodologies and concentrated practice
specializations in just a mere three decades. Interestingly, although social
work’s rapid and diverse growth may have it prepared for present and future
societal concerns, it has fanned the flames of a generalist-specialist debate
(Leighninger, 1980) in social work education, further splitting the discipline
and magnifying the need for “cauterizing” social worker’s identity wounds, not
with a “hot iron” but with a common conceptual framework. A framework was need
that would accommodate growth and diversity in a profession that requires
growth and diversity.
It is even more ironic to see a discipline whose stock and trade is change and
understanding the change process, historically having an uncomfortably
difficult time of either changing or, having changed, not knowing how to
adequately accommodate the change in a manner that sustains a coherent
discipline. Knowledge of our own discipline’s coping abilities with change
should serve to inspire us to be that much more patient with client’s who appear
to be slow to change. Indeed, as “change agents,” our identity and survival, as
a profession, may eventually come down to how well we cope with our own change
as much as any function we may or may not have, or cause we do or don’t pursue.
The Profession
Besides confronting us with a past having two different “heads” (Addams’
and Richmond’s) and their respective “facts” the hydra-like social work
identity brings us “face to face” with our paradigm shifts and multiplication
of practice specializations; the generalist-specialist debate; and to rub salt
in the as yet cauterized wound, this two-headed identity struggle pesters us
with whether or not a professional status is warranted for social work.
The professional status debate ignited at a National Conference of Charities
and Correction (NCCC) conference in 1915
when the prestigious Abraham Flexner presented a paper entitled, “Is
Social Work a Profession?” (Austin 1983; Popple 1985). Flexner mixed praise
with poison and concluded social work was not a profession. Thereafter, social
workers, generally, and Mary Richmond, specifically, attempted to have social
work meet Flexner’s criteria for a profession. Popple argues that the drive for
professional status proved to be dysfunctional for social work. Austin concedes, however, that the
Flexner myth,
…in many way...has been a useful stimulus to the development of social work. The attention to the institutional structure of the profession, the drive for recognition within universities the continuing examination of the intellectual foundations of social work practice, and the effort to bridge the gap between research and practice. (p. 373)
But on the negative side Austin admits to the Myth’s influence upon,
...a frequently obsessive concern with intellectual unity and a preoccupation with defining a ‘unique’ method....(and) a defensive and apologetic posture, reflecting constant concern with the question as to whether other groups in society recognize the professional status of social work (373).
Popple paradoxically argues that social work was a profession long before an organized occupation was developed to claim the pre-existing professional status of its social worker members. The implication here is that social work’s efforts to qualify it as a profession on Flexner’s terms was unnecessary. Popple explains this paradox:
In a pre-industrial society, dependency is not a great problem because its handled by the family, church and community. As societies develop and industrialize, these institutions begin to breakdown, and dependency becomes a serious problem. Atherton argues that ‘when the industrial society recognized dependency as a threatening state of affairs, it evolved a social mechanism -- a technology or profession -- to deal with it.’ This is, of course, social work (pp. 572-573).
But, is this
common social assignment sufficient to define the social work identity? Is each
social worker’s awareness of his/her role, in effectively managing dependency,
enough to unify the social work occupational specialties into a “federated
profession?” It may be necessary, but not sufficient.
For example, imagine a new social assignment suddenly surfacing which is too
complex to be dealt with bureaucratically, call it “SA”. Next, imagine asking
if they are “professional” and they reply, “Yes, because we have a social
assignment “SA”. We further ask about the skills, knowledge, methods,
values, philosophy or conceptual framework that grounds their profession. Now,
if their reply is that, “no organized occupation containing these elements
exists,” we might wonder about their claim of professional status, if all they
have is a social assignment unembroidered with skills, knowledge, methods,
values, philosophy, conceptual framework or organization. We might ask how long
can such a claim last without such embroidery? Indeed, can it do without these
elements entirely? If it cannot, then social assignment to the management of
some new form of human dependency is not sufficient as the criterion of what
constitutes a profession. An unlikely scenario you say, sure it is. But the
unlikelihood doesn’t diminish its logic.
The Philosophy
Weick (1987) claims that social
work’s philosophical base has developed an unequal balance. The philosophy, she
adds, was derived from a blend of humanistic values and a commitment to the
quantitative methods of the natural sciences. The imbalance is said to be in
favor of quantification at the expense of values. In social work’s
well-intentioned efforts to be a coherent profession it channeled much of its
energy into a social science arena, dominated by a 19th century physical
science model. In short, qualitative aspects of practice have been neglected
for the quantitative aspects.
Although we have traditional values (e.g., client self-determination, inherent
human rights, and non-judgmental responses, to name a few), Weick argues that
these are “derivative of and dependent on a larger philosophical perspective”
(p. 219). Our desire to be respected as a profession, we felt, necessitated
shaping “the profession in the image of the prevailing empirical paradigm”
(Weick p. 222). Weick then suggests that a new paradigm shift may be gaining
momentum that could both provide this larger philosophical perspective and
redress the decades of imbalance in social work’s philosophical foundation
caused by our unprofessional preoccupation to be professional.
The (New) Paradigm
According to Weick, the new paradigm
shift is already occurring in other fields. Hints of these developments are
found in holistic health, quantum physics, adult development, and human
liberation movements. There is a growing “emphasis on the potential of people
to grow toward fullness recognizing their tremendous strength in maintaining
integrity of both body and mind and in growing through crises and difficulties”
(p. 225). The following lengthy quotation from Weick comes closest to
captioning what hints at a (new) paradigm, which blends the (old) paradigm and
a firm metaphysical/spiritual element:
Holistic approaches recognize that people
do or can know what is best for them. This wisdom is a reflection of the
inherent life force that provides the interior stimulus for continued growth
and well-being. When seen in this, the social work value of self-determination
takes on new meaning. The basis for this self-knowing is not a cognitive
process so much as a deep inner sense of one’s own particular needs for growth.
As such, it does not respond to what tends to be the overly rational bias in
human behavior theories but suggests that there are ways of knowing that have
correlates in the physical, emotional, and spiritual dimensions of each person.
A key factor in helping people know what they know (i.e., discover their inner
wisdom) is in understanding the ways that the social environment (e.g., culture,
institutions, and groups) impedes this discovery. It is here that the social
work recognition of the social context of human development is critical (p.
225). On several different levels, the insights from other fields can
contribute to a more complex understanding of these interactional dynamics.
One important concept for understanding the nature of these dynamics comes from
work on holography. A hologram is a form of lens-less photography in which it
can be demonstrated that any part of the whole contains the whole. According to
Capra, ‘If any part of a hologram is illuminated, the entire image will be
reconstructed.’ This phenomenon has become an important metaphor in work by
physicist David Bohm and neuroscientist Karl Pribram as a way of theorizing
about the interdependence among all levels of matter. In Bohm’s notion of an
implicate order, he theorizes that all matter is enfolded in each of it parts.
Pribram has applied the concept of hologram to brain functioning as a way of
suggesting ‘the whole is encoded in each part.’ Whether those theories are
supported in their particular applications is less important than is the
growing notion that there is an inextricable interrelation among all matter
whether organic of inorganic (p. 225-226).
The core area of development is the philosophical - conceptual one.
It is here that the principles underlying a social work perspective or
worldview need to be articulated. As indicated above, the principles could be
usefully amplified by new developments in the fields of physics, psychology,
philosophy, biology, health and anthropology. The key would be to draw on the
writing found on the edges of these fields that seems to be moving toward a new
paradigm. The philosophical principles would describe a view of human
development and change that draws on past social work wisdom but that also
brings that wisdom to a new level of articulation, sophistication, and vision
(p. 228).
In the end, Weick’s paper is appropriately anchored largely in an intuition of hers and not in what she would now call the (old) paradigm of empiricism.
Weick suggests
that social work is strategically positioned to be on the cutting edge of the
new paradigm movement if it hasn’t become dependent upon, instead of
interdependent upon, the (old) paradigm of empiricism. Essentially, Weick views
social work as a holistic profession needing a holistic paradigm and a holistic
philosophical perspective.
One crucial task of social work today is to counterbalance the long-time
imbalance favoring empiricism over practice wisdom. Weick recommends giving
more breathing space to practice wisdom and to the “new age” thinking in
several other disciplines which have been smothering under the weight of
empiricism.
So much of what Weick is saying in her paper overlaps with or echoes a general
systems theory orientation. Surprisingly, although she makes passing reference
to the “ecological perspective” in social work and often uses the words
“holistic” and “holism,” she the doesn’t once use the words “system”, “eco-system,”
“systems theory,” or “systems approach.”
The paradigm (new) I find compelling, but when I consider just how established the
paradigm (old) is, it is difficult to see how the strengths of empiricism and
the corresponding vested interests, within the social sciences and natural
sciences, in empiricism, are going to be persuaded to give up some of “their”
territory.
Concluding Remarks
I have an uneasy feeling that the
hydra-like social work identity is laughing at us at this very moment. Here we
are, concluding a paper by suggesting a move to a paradigm (new) that will
apparently just add a few more “heads” to the social work identity. But what
the hydra-like social work identity doesn’t yet appreciate, wallowing in
self-satisfied giggles, is that some holistic or systems approach, while
perhaps initially adding more “heads,” may have the potential to cauterize the
social work identity wound with a common conceptual framework that can
accommodate, under a single disciplinary identity, all of the multiplying
“heads” of the current social work identity.
The immediate purpose of this paper was to offer an historical explanation of
the social work identity problem. The long-term purpose was to set the stage
for a second paper in which I will explain why we presently find a tag-team of
systems approaches in the (conceptual) wrestling ring pitting their
(conceptual) frames against the hydra-like social work identity. The major part
of this explanation will compare and contrast the general systems, ecological
systems, and natural systems theories. I will also present a slight variation
of Ramsay’s common conceptual framework blending (old) paradigm and (new)
paradigm to begin the cauterizing of a century-old wound.
References
Austin DM (1983). The Flexner Myth and the History of Social Work. Social Service Review, (September), 357-377.
Franklin DL (1986). Mary Richmond and Jane Addams: From Moral Certainty to Rational Inquiry in Social Work Practice. Social Service Review, (December), 504-525.
Leighninger L (1980). The Generalist-Specialist Debate in Social Work. Social Service Review, (March), 1-12.
Meyer CH. Ed.
(1983). Clinical Social Work in the
Eco-Systems Perspective, pp. 6-7. New York: Columbia University Press.
Popple P (1985). The Social Work Profession: A Reconceptualization. Social Service Review, (December),
560-576.
Ramsay RF (1986). Social Work’s Search
for a Common Conceptual Framework. Proceedings: 23rd International Congress
of Schools of Social Work (August 27-31), Tokyo, Japan. Eds. V. Kojima and T.
Hosaka, 50-57.
Weick A (1987). Reconceptualizing the Philosophical Perspective of Social Work.
Social Service Review, (June), 218-230.