Pueblos, Planets, and Permian Puzzles: The Perils and Promise of Analogical Evidence in the Historical Sciences

Congratulations to Joseph Annan for successfully defending their MA thesis, "Pueblos, Planets, and Permian Puzzles: The Perils and Promise of Analogical Evidence in the Historical Sciences" on April 30, 2025. The thesis was supervised by Marc Ereshefsky. It was examined by Marc Ereshefsky, Megan Delehanty, Jeremy Fantl.

We asked Joseph to provide us with some insight into his thesis and his graduate studies experience in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Calgary.

Tell us about your thesis topic:

My thesis investigates how scientists reconstruct the deep past in disciplines like archaeology, geology, and paleontology—fields where direct experimentation is often impossible and material traces are fragmentary, degraded, or absent. Philosophers have traditionally emphasized trace-based inference, where causal remnants of the past serve as evidence. I argue that this emphasis neglects a second, equally important source of evidence: analogue evidence. Scientists frequently rely on material and mathematical analogues—systems that share relevant structural or causal features—to constrain hypotheses about the past.

Drawing on case studies ranging from Martian geomorphology, ethnoarchaeological analogies, prehistoric ecosystems, and early-universe cosmology, I outline a framework for evaluating the epistemic strength of analogical inferences. Far from being limited to hypothesis generation, I argue that, under the right conditions, analogical reasoning can serve an evidential role. The project explores several epistemic strategies that make this kind of reasoning more robust, including the use of analogues in the comparative method to support causal claims, the construction of “composite analogues” for historically unique systems, and what I call “analogue experiments”: controlled interventions on analogues that generate new empirical constraints. Together, these tools challenge the assumption that historical science is purely interpretive or reliant on accidental trace preservation and reveal that its inferential strategies often parallel experimental reasoning.

What was the most valuable outcome of the graduate program for you?

The program helped me move beyond abstract philosophical analysis by engaging directly with scientific case studies, especially in modelling, simulation, and reconstruction. That shift from purely conceptual work to practice-sensitive inquiry changed how I frame and evaluate philosophical problems. The department’s strong engagement with the philosophy of science, especially its openness to interdisciplinary approaches, allowed me to refine my thinking and develop sharper, more focused questions. The guidance of my supervisor and exposure to a wide range of literature helped me challenge my assumptions, refine my arguments, and become more deliberate in how I approach philosophical inquiry.

What are the next steps/plans for you?

I’m currently preparing parts of the thesis for publication and pursuing related research questions on scientific reasoning in contexts of evidential scarcity—where direct observation or experimentation is limited, and inference must rely on indirect methods. I am also working on other philosophical topics that interest me, such as the epistemology of psychotherapy and the ontology of created types. I will pursue doctoral work in philosophy of science after taking a gap year to focus on some other creative pursuits, including music, photography, and game design.